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I became a philosophy major in community college (thank you, professor Daniele Bolelli!) and maintained my interest after transferring to UCLA from which I graduated in 2014. As an undergraduate student, I attended an APA session in epistemology and became addicted to Gettier literature. I took a gap year and wrote my writing sample for graduate school on how Gettier is wrong about Plato (and Plato is correct that knowlege is not something like a justified true belief).
In 2015, I began graduate studies at Saint Louis University. My research interest remained in epistemology but I moved beyond Plato (likely because I can't read Attic Greek!). Under John Greco's supervision, I became a doctoral candidate in 2019. | ||||
Present Research:
| Joakim, Dissertation Abstract |
| Joakim, Research Statement |
Dissertation (expected May 2020)
I broaden the limits of knowledge beyond traditional conceptions and contemporary alternatives.
I argue for knowledge beyond the scope of belief, hence my title: Knowledge Beyond Belief.
I broaden the limits of knowledge beyond traditional conceptions and contemporary alternatives.
I argue for knowledge beyond the scope of belief, hence my title: Knowledge Beyond Belief.
Future Research:
In a future research project, I plan to investigate the differences between knowing and counting as a knower. Is knowing more fundamental than counting as a knower? Are there conditions under which one is more valuable? Consider a man alone on an island; he possesses knowledge that his volleyball is floating away by visually perceiving this, but no one counts him as knowing it (most may count him dead!). Some contextualists argue that the conditions on knowledge can differ across a range of cases; but are there differing conditions in the same situation for being counted as a knower by members of one’s own community as opposed to others? This research finds interesting applications to the epistemology of ignorance and standpoint theory. Members of marginalized groups are not often counted as knowers because of an epistemic injustice done unto them because of someone’s bias against a minority status. Is there a kind of knowledge possessed only by those who are not counted as knowers? My current and future research are likely conducted from a pragmatic lens through which theory is discovered in light of practical differences.
In a future research project, I plan to investigate how my epistemology applies to case law involving testimony. Mental attitudes like knowledge and belief are not equal, among other reasons, because it is easier to test for knowledge. Doing so, however, requires that the test giver knows and therefore can verify that the subject possesses the truth. In legal cases, most often, the truth is unclear. Regardless, there needs to be proof beyond a reasonable doubt before the verdict. In American courts, we seek what is demonstrable in terms of empirical proof. Yet confessions are the gold standard that trumps all other evidence presentable in a case. The prosecution's best evidence is the suspect’s testimony admitting to some act, but people’s self-reports are shifty. Memory is fallible and beliefs are easily persuaded to change. For example, people can be made to believe that they committed an act which they know they did not. How do we discriminate between the testimony of one person who gives two incompatible results? It seems that one’s beliefs may change yet knowledge does not. But how do we discover which testimony is knowledge? Lie detector tests would be unhelpful. The machine detects lying, not truth. Since people can be wrong about what the truth is, reporting what one takes oneself to know is not asserting a lie. If someone is genuinely convinced that they are correct about some event, their assertion that it is so will not be marked as a lie. Plausibly, reports of what one knows are merely reported beliefs. Since belief is fallible, this would make testimony an unreliable source of information in cases it is treated as the gold standard. An unrealistic solution is to stop using testimony in court, but it is not clear what to do.
In a future research project, I plan to update popular epistemologies with my account. Consider reliabilism and evidentialism. The epistemologies are not pre-packaged for conception of knowledge without belief. But we can easily reconsider epistemologies without assuming that belief has a secure place. I will argue that we should, and that nothing worth keeping is lost by doing so. My account of knowledge (without belief) allows for new answers to tried issues. I will update the discussion on belief-first epistemology and explain that Gettier-era literature was misguided having assumed knowledge requires belief. I will update knowledge-first epistemology and explain why Williamson is correct that we can analyze concepts (e.g.,) action in terms of knowledge without relying on belief. My account updates our answer to Moore’s paradox and Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions, as well as clarifies what is at stake in the debate on (anti-) reductionism. There are other tried and untrue theories on important issues to which my account adds fresh perspective, I will end by noting some.
In a future research project, I plan to investigate how my epistemology applies to case law involving testimony. Mental attitudes like knowledge and belief are not equal, among other reasons, because it is easier to test for knowledge. Doing so, however, requires that the test giver knows and therefore can verify that the subject possesses the truth. In legal cases, most often, the truth is unclear. Regardless, there needs to be proof beyond a reasonable doubt before the verdict. In American courts, we seek what is demonstrable in terms of empirical proof. Yet confessions are the gold standard that trumps all other evidence presentable in a case. The prosecution's best evidence is the suspect’s testimony admitting to some act, but people’s self-reports are shifty. Memory is fallible and beliefs are easily persuaded to change. For example, people can be made to believe that they committed an act which they know they did not. How do we discriminate between the testimony of one person who gives two incompatible results? It seems that one’s beliefs may change yet knowledge does not. But how do we discover which testimony is knowledge? Lie detector tests would be unhelpful. The machine detects lying, not truth. Since people can be wrong about what the truth is, reporting what one takes oneself to know is not asserting a lie. If someone is genuinely convinced that they are correct about some event, their assertion that it is so will not be marked as a lie. Plausibly, reports of what one knows are merely reported beliefs. Since belief is fallible, this would make testimony an unreliable source of information in cases it is treated as the gold standard. An unrealistic solution is to stop using testimony in court, but it is not clear what to do.
In a future research project, I plan to update popular epistemologies with my account. Consider reliabilism and evidentialism. The epistemologies are not pre-packaged for conception of knowledge without belief. But we can easily reconsider epistemologies without assuming that belief has a secure place. I will argue that we should, and that nothing worth keeping is lost by doing so. My account of knowledge (without belief) allows for new answers to tried issues. I will update the discussion on belief-first epistemology and explain that Gettier-era literature was misguided having assumed knowledge requires belief. I will update knowledge-first epistemology and explain why Williamson is correct that we can analyze concepts (e.g.,) action in terms of knowledge without relying on belief. My account updates our answer to Moore’s paradox and Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions, as well as clarifies what is at stake in the debate on (anti-) reductionism. There are other tried and untrue theories on important issues to which my account adds fresh perspective, I will end by noting some.